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Abstract 
Although stakeholder participation is expected to promote equitable and sustainable natural 
resource management, lessons from the past tell us that more careful attention needs to be 
paid to achieving equitable impacts. Now the question is how to address social inequities and 
power asymmetries. Some authors emphasize the need for more dialogue, while others prefer 
a critical perspective, arguing that dialogue might not be sufficient to avert the risk of a 
process deepening existing social inequities. This article aims to enrich this debate and 
question the practical implications of the critical perspective through an in-depth analysis of 
power games in a participatory process.  
A Companion Modelling (ComMod) process was conducted in an Akha community of 
Northern Thailand with a critical perspective, i.e. with a concern for the less influent 
stakeholders. Simulation tools such as role-playing games were used to mediate a cross-
cultural learning process among researchers, farmers and administrators about a local 
irrigation water management problem.  
The detailed analysis of power games in this learning and negotiation process reveals that in 
spite of initial power asymmetries, the poorest farmers of the community started to voice and 
assert their interests. 
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We identify a set of practical facilitation methods that helped to manage power asymmetries 
and to level the playing field but we also discuss the main limits of our cultural-embedded 
methodological choices.    
Acknowledging that ‘the facilitators’ neutrality’ is an illusion, this study allows us to raise the 
question of their social legitimacy. We suggest that they should systematically make explicit 
their cultural-ideological background and methodological hypothesis and choices and their 
effects on the socio-political context. This article is an original attempt to accept this 
challenge. 
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Introduction  
As in other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand’s recent policy-making framework regarding 
natural resource management favours decentralization and public participation (Arghiros, 
2001). This is an important opportunity for ethnic minorities living in the highlands of 
northern Thailand who have been accused for many years by the Thai majority of degrading 
the upper watersheds of the country’s major basins and had so far limited voice in decision-
making processes affecting them (Mac Kinnon and Vienne, 1989).  
However, stakeholder participation is challenging. Socio-ecosystems are complex and 
uncertain, with numerous interacting ecological and socio-economic dynamics, and an 
increasing number of stakeholders with different legitimate perspectives. There is a need for 
innovative methodologies and tools to enable stakeholders to manage such complex systems. 
The companion modelling (ComMod) approach accepts the challenge and proposes to co-
construct simulation tools integrating the different stakeholders’ perspectives and to use them 
to enhance dialogue, collective learning and the exploration of possible scenarios in these 
complex socio-ecosystems (Barreteau et al., 2003; Bousquet et al., 1999).  
But ComMod, like many other participatory approaches, is confronted with the issue of power 
inequalities. How to deal with local power differences? More and more authors argue that 
participatory interventions with little attention for the socio-political context tend to hurt the 
interests of less powerful stakeholders (Nelson and Wright, 1995; Wollenberg et al., 2001). 
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Two main postures can be distinguished: those who believe in ‘dialogue’ and those who 
promote a ‘critical perspective’ (Faysse, 2006). Proponents of dialogue consider the lack of 
genuine communication as the main obstacle to fruitful collaboration and coordination. 
According to them, once this barrier is removed, it is possible to build a common vision 
through social learning and to achieve a consensus for collective action (Pretty, 1995; Röling 
and Wagemakers, 1998). But the promoters of the critical perspective argue that power 
relations need to be examined prior to the participatory process; otherwise, there is a high risk 
of the process deepening existing social inequities. These authors consider participation as a 
negotiation process rather than a social learning process (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001; 
Leeuwis, 2000). However, the “dialogue” and “critical” perspectives are not necessarily 
antagonist. Social learning is indeed the basis for creative and integrative negotiation 
processes (Leeuwis, 2004).   
This article aims to enrich the debate about the way to deal with power inequities in 
participatory processes through an in-depth analysis of power dynamics in a ComMod 
experiment that adopted a critical posture. This ComMod experiment aimed to facilitate 
learning and negotiation about an irrigation water sharing problem in an Akha community in 
the highlands of northern Thailand. Given the importance of cultural differences among the 
participants in this cultural context, this paper emphasizes the role of cultural differences in 
power games in mediated cross-cultural learning processes.  
This article starts with a presentation of the fundamental principles of the ComMod approach, 
our conceptual framework based on critical systems thinking and the ComMod methodology 
implemented at this site. A second section describes the initial socio-political and cultural 
context and analyses the expression and evolution of power games in the facilitated learning 
and negotiation process. The article ends with a discussion on the potential, limits and 
perspectives for the improvement of the ComMod approach to level the playing field and give 
voice to  the perspective of the marginalized. Following Webler’s (1999) advice, we not only 
focus on what works, but also analyse why it works and how it could work better.  
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Conceptual framework and research methodology 
Fundamental principles of the ComMod approach 
ComMod is a participatory action research approach developed since the mid 1990’s by a 
group5 a researchers that use simulation tools to deal with complex systems in the field of 
management of renewable resources and the environment (Barreteau et al., 2003; Bousquet et 
al., 1999). ComMod researchers focus on the complexity and uncertainty of their research 
objects, and on the existence of multiple, legitimate perspectives, including those produced by 
scientific expertise. ComMod aims to integrate these different perspectives in an iterative 
process of understanding, confrontation and analysis. It can have two possible aims: to learn 
about systems or to support concerted processes in these systems. The ComMod approach 
applies a cyclical approach, alternating modelling and field activities, with systematic 
feedback to local stakeholders and discussion of assumptions backing the modelling work. 
This approach is fundamentally adaptive in order to take into account the local stakeholders’ 
preoccupations, perspectives and interests. In the past decade, it has been applied in many 
places globally (see for example D’aquino et al., 2003; Etienne, 2003) and at a dozen sites in 
Southeast Asia (Bousquet et al., 2005). Because ComMod researchers differ slightly in their 
theoretical perspective and consequently in the research methodology they embrace, the ones 
we adopted in this study are presented below.   
The ComMod action research presented in this paper was conducted by the first, third 
and fifth authors of this paper (some ComMod researchers) in the context of the PhD thesis of 
the first author (the main facilitator of the ComMod process). The fourth author facilitated the 
gaming sessions in Thai language. The second author joined the team afterwards to conduct 
an external evaluation of this ComMod process, in addition to the evaluation conducted by the 
first author along the process. Therefore, in this paper, “we” means both the people who 
conducted this process and the people who analyzed it.  
Theoretical framework: a critical systems approach 
Systems thinking has enabled various disciplines to attain a more holistic, interdisciplinary 
perspective on reality. Nowadays, three major strands of systems thinking can be identified: 
hard, soft and critical (Flood and Romm, 1995). Soft systems thinking was developed in 
reaction to the technology oriented hard systems thinking which assumes that, to remain 
                                                 
5 Approximately 40 researchers belonging to diverse organizations from diverse countries and with diverse 
disciplinary background 
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objective, researchers should stay outside the system they are studying. Based on a 
constructionist epistemology, soft systems thinking focuses on the various interpretations of a 
given situation by stakeholders and emphasizes the need for collective learning among them 
(Checkland, 1981). So far, ComMod researchers have opted for a soft systems approach. In 
this experiment and in this paper, we opt for a critical systems perspective. Also based on a 
constructionist epistemology, critical systems thinking emerged in reaction to the failure of 
soft and hard systems thinking to deal with coercive situations and to address power 
imbalances among stakeholders (Ulrich, 2003). Core commitments in critical systems 
thinking include (Jackson, 2000):  
- Critical awareness: a never-ending attempt to uncover hidden assumptions,  
- Social awareness and human emancipation: to prevent coercion and exercise of power 
from distorting communication to promote a more equitable distribution of power, 
- Complementarity: the acknowledgement that various systems approaches tend to 
provide different rationalities which complement each other.  
Whereas the principle of critical awareness is already explicit in the current ComMod charter, 
social awareness and human emancipation are not. The objective of this contribution is to 
analyse the importance of power relations in a ComMod process and to reflect on the 
pertinence for ComMod researchers to use the critical systems approach.  
 
To analyse the socio-ecological system and changes triggered by the ComMod intervention, 
we used the theoretical framework described on the Figure 1. The agrarian system theory 
(Mazoyer and Roudart, 1997) allowed us to apprehend the historical evolution of socio-
economic differentiation of the resource users and the emergence of different types of farming 
households, each characterized by specific socio-economic and agro-ecological constraints, 
interests and strategies (Trébuil and Dufumier, 1993). In particular, it provides insight in the 
differential economic power resources among various farmer types and their respective 
interests in the negotiation process.  
Power theories enabled us to better understand stakeholder relations and interactions. We 
considered power as a relational concept. People may have power resources, but it is in the 
interaction that they exert power. Weber (1968) defined power as the chance that an 
individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against the resistance 
of others. This is a ‘power over’ form of power (Vermeulen, 2005). Rowlands (1995) 
describes it as ‘zero-sum’: the more power one person has, the less the other has. Classical 
dichotomies derived from this definition of power, seeing the powerful on one side and the 
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powerless on the other, are problematic because they do not take into account ‘the power of 
the powerless’, and therefore deny the possibility of becoming empowered, as to empower 
means reinforcing an existing power. However, power is not a simple resource that people 
have or don’t have. There are actually different kinds of resources used to exert different 
kinds of power forms as well as various possible relational mechanisms in power 
relationships. Resources to exert power can be categorized into three main types: (a) 
knowledge, (b) cultural norms and values attributing traditional, legal or charismatic authority 
to certain roles, and (c) physical resources such as money, natural resources or human 
resources and skills (Giddens, 1984; Van Paassen, 2004). Cultural differences such as the 
belonging to different ethnic groups fall into the second category, but they also have 
repercussions in the first and third ones. Boulding (1989) characterized power relations 
according to three mechanisms: the stick, the carrot and the hug. The stick and carrot are 
familiar metaphors, stick standing for force, and carrot for enticement. Both are coercive 
forms of power, i.e. ‘power over’ forms of power. The most innovative concept in Boulding’s 
work is the hug because it provides a variable to look at the empowerment of the 
disadvantaged and marginalized. The hug is a way to describe integrative or cooperative 
forms of power, i.e. the power of people joining together and obeying the same principles. 
This corresponds to ‘power to’ and ‘power from within’ forms of power (Vermeulen, 2005). 
Counter power (the power to oppose the oppressors) can be seen as a form of cooperative 
power of the less powerful stakeholders.  
Since our analysis of power relations took place in a context of decentralization, we 
distinguished two kinds of social interactions: the horizontal interactions among people within 
a community, and the vertical interactions between villagers and higher level institutions, with 
the key role of local leaders and representatives at the intersection of these two dimensions. 
Following Ribot (2001), we highlight the importance of their representation and downward 
accountability to achieve democratic decentralization.  
Apart from a contextual analysis, we also studied the expressions of power relations during 
the ComMod process. In multi-stakeholder processes, there are several possible expressions 
of power (Faysse, 2006; Leeuwis, 2000), such as the power: 
- To include certain people or not in the process;  
- To stay away from the process;  
- To make people aware of a certain issue, making it an issue-at-stake they want to 
discuss and change; 
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- To impose one’s ideas during the discussion by dominating and/or ignoring other 
people’s opinions;  
- To control the implementation of decisions at a certain administrative level.  
Powerful stakeholders often refrain from negotiating if they have a good BATNA (Best 
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, Fisher and Ury, 1981). In some cases, they only 
engage in negotiations once the other parties have increased their power base, or when they 
are forced to do so by powerful actors at a higher hierarchical level.  
When negotiations start, the less powerful stakeholders need the capacity to defend their 
interests. Effective advocacy requires self-confidence, freedom to express oneself, access to 
information and a thorough understanding of the issue at stake. To attain this capacity, 
marginalized actors might need to be empowered. Rowlands (1995) identified three 
dimensions of empowerment corresponding to three different forms of power:  
- Personal empowerment: development of self-confidence and personal capacities 
corresponding to what Vermeulen (2005) called ‘power to’, 
- Relational empowerment: development of skills to influence relationships 
corresponding to the so-called ‘power over’ , and  
- Collective empowerment: learning to work together to achieve more (a ‘power from 
within’). 
Leeuwis (2000) proposed using negotiation theory as a theoretical assumption behind 
participatory processes to better handle power imbalances and social conflicts. Scholars in the 
field of negotiation commonly distinguish between compromise and integration (Follett, 
1940, cited by Carnevale, 2006). This corresponds to some other authors’ distinction between 
distributive and integrative negotiation (Rubin, 1994; van Woerkum et al., 1999; Leeuwis 
2004). In a distributive negotiation, stakeholders tend to stick to their own positions, and 
finally each side gives up something, meeting midway between opening positions. They 
simply ‘share the cake’ in a zero-sum outcome. In contrast, in an integrative negotiation 
process, the stakeholders creatively reframe the problem to ‘enlarge the cake’ and identify 
‘win-win’ solutions. This implies a collective learning process in which both sides look 
beyond their initial positioning to examine the underlying interests determining them. 
Leeuwis (2004) described a set of tasks necessary to achieve such integrative negotiation: 
learning about the current situation, increased awareness of a problem to be solved 
collectively, learning about other stakeholders’ perceptions, collective re-phrasing of the 
nature of the problem, coordination of interests through identification and negotiation of new 
scenarios to solve the re-phrased problem.  
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To end with, we referred to Ulrich’s critical system perspective to analyse our own way to 
facilitate the multi-stakeholders process. This author suggests in particular that facilitators of 
multi-stakeholder processes should be aware of their own biases regarding social inequities 
and power asymmetries among stakeholders (Ulrich, 2003). Jackson (2000) adds critical 
system scientists take some distance to study power dynamics first, and then strategically 
choose for a facilitation method best fit to create awareness and empowerment of the 
marginalised. In the ComMod cycle described in this paper, the main facilitator was aware of 
her cultural-ideological stance favouring an equitable process. She structured the RGG and 
ABM in such a way that the position of the marginalized farmers became visible so they had a 
chance to voice and assert their interests.       
The ComMod action research methodology as applied in the 3rd ComMod cycle in Mae 
Salaep, northern Thailand  
A cyclical ComMod process was conducted between 2002 and 2007 in the Akha village of 
Mae Salaep, Chiang Rai Province, upper northern Thailand. In this experiment, the main 
successive phases of a ComMod cycle were as follows: (i) characterization of the problem, 
(ii) converting this knowledge into a simulator, and (iii) participatory simulations to question 
the model assumptions and explore scenarios. We used two different simulation tools: role-
playing games (RPG) and agent-based models (ABM). RPG allows multiple stakeholders to 
interactively examine the complex systems of which they are part and to experientially test 
alternative scenarios and solutions to solve the issues-at-stake (Duke, 1974). But RPGs 
become costly and time consuming if stakeholders wish to try a spectrum of solutions or need 
to explore long-term effects of their decisions. To remove this constraint, it is possible to 
build an associated computerized ABM, similar to the RPG, which is more time-efficient in 
simulating scenarios. The RPG is then a way to ‘open the black box of the model’ as it allows 
the players to understand what the ABM is doing, to validate and criticize it (Barreteau et al., 
2001).  
The learning process stimulated by a given ComMod cycle may raise new questions to 
be examined in a following cycle with modified RPG and/or associated ABM. This is what 
happened in the present ComMod experiment (Figure 2). In a first cycle focusing on soil 
erosion risk (Trébuil et al., 2002), the participating villagers in Mae Salaep identified the 
expansion of perennial crops as a promising solution, and requested a second cycle focusing 
on the socio-economic constraints limiting their ability to invest in such crops (Barnaud et al., 
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2008a). Later on, as these perennial crops required irrigation, the participants requested to 
explore water management issues in a third ComMod cycle which is the focus of this article.  
This paper focuses on the third cycle, which started with an analysis of the agrarian 
and institutional aspects of the water problem: semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with two dozens of farmers representing the diversity of farming strategies in the village of 
Mae Salaep, the village headman and the key stakeholders of the sub-district administration 
(the TAO – Tambon Administrative Organization), i.e. the TAO village representatives, the 
TAO officers, and the president of the TAO council. The local knowledge acquired with these 
interviews was used to modify the previous RPG and ABM to focus on the water issue. These 
simulation tools (presented in details in Barnaud et al., 2007, 2008a, 2008c) integrated and 
highlighted the diversity of perspectives and interests regarding the water issue among the 
different types of farming households. These tools were used in a three-day participatory 
workshop organized in the village. 12 villagers had been selected and invited by the research 
team. The main selection criteria were as follows: they represented the diversity of farming 
strategies in the village regarding the water issue, they were potentially able to defend their 
interests (communication skills, self confidence reinforced by the presence of closed 
acquaintances), and the participants of the first and second cycle were selected in priority to 
ensure the continuity of the whole ComMod process..  
On the first day, gaming sessions were organized with the 12 villagers playing a role 
similar to their real life situation. After a first gaming session played with rules corresponding 
to the current water use situation, a collective debriefing was organized for the participants to 
discuss the problems encountered in this gaming session and their possible solutions. Then the 
facilitator suggested to the 12 villagers-players to present their preferred solution to the TAO 
president which had also been invited to the workshop. In the afternoon, a second gaming 
session allowed the villagers to further explore this potential solution by modifying the initial 
rules of the game. On the second day of the workshop, individual interviews were conducted 
with the 12 villagers-players to compare researchers’ and participants’representations of the 
situation, to better understand players’ behaviour during the gaming sessions, to learn about 
their individual opinions regarding the collectively discussed issues and to assess the short-
term learning effects of the RPG sessions. On the third day, participatory ABM simulations 
were conducted in a plenary session with the 12 participants to allow them to further reflect 
on their preferred scenarios. Three weeks and three months later, more ABM participatory 
simulations were conducted within smaller and more homogenous groups to accompany the 
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on-going discussions in the village (beyond the 12 participants) which had been stimulated by 
the three-day workshop.  
 
To assess the dynamic and the effects of the ComMod process, we adopted an interpretive 
approach, trying to interpret what the participants think and why they act the way they act.  
Data on cognitive changes triggered by the ComMod process were obtained via semi-
structured individual interviews of the 12 participants conducted before the workshop and one 
day, three weeks and three months after the workshop. These interviews aimed to assess the 
evolution of the following indicators: 
-     Stakeholders’ perceptions of the issue, 
- Their perceptions of other stakeholders and their interactions with them,  
- Their perceptions of the possible scenarios to mitigate the problem at stake.  
 The results of these interviews were analyzed using Atlas.ti, a software facilitating the 
qualitative analysis of texts.  
The analysis of the collective dynamics of the group was based on observations of the 
participants’ behaviour and discourses during the gaming sessions and group debates. Three 
researchers were observers during the workshop and took note of all the features which 
seemed interesting to them. A debriefing was organized afterwards with the rest of the 
facilitation team. Moreover, all the group sessions were video recorded. These videos were 
not systematically analyzed but their visioning helped to better understand some specific 
events or to identify elements which would have been overlooked by the observers.   
The results of this analysis of the ComMod process are presented in the next sections.  
Ecological, socio-political and cultural context 
Water management issue 
The local irrigation system uses gravity through a network of small PVC pipes connected to 
the creeks, each creek providing enough water to irrigate from one to three plantations. Due to 
the recent expansion of irrigated lychee and Oolong tea plantations and the increasing water 
shortage, social tensions about unequal access to water have heightened within the 
community. This issue concerned various stakeholders having specific interests, embedded in 
a specific cultural context and a complex network of power relationships.  
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Main types of farming households  
The integration of farming households into the market economy has led to extensive socio-
economic differentiation (Table 1). Well-off type C farmers are well-off farmers who belong 
to influential clans of first settlers and sit on the traditional council of elders. Fifteen years 
ago, when they invested in the first lychee plantations and irrigation facilities in the village, 
they claimed that the first-come-first-served rule was an ancestral custom to regulate access to 
water. This rule stipulates that once a farmer has set up water pipes in a creek, other villagers 
cannot get water from the upstream section. As a result, only this minority of well-off farmers 
currently has access to water.  
Type A and B households belong to smaller and less influential clans. Most of them do not 
openly question the first-come-first-served rule, including the farmers who invested in lychee 
plantations and cannot irrigate them. Not only because they do not want to break what is seen 
as an ancestral community rule, but also because they are (partly) dependent on type C clans, 
from whom they borrow money or work as hired labourers. In terms of power relations, type 
C farmers use both traditional authority and physical resources to exert power through 
enticement over type A and type B farmers (Figure 3).  
The Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO)  
Villagers asked ComMod researchers to explore the water management issue, and requested 
the participation of the Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organization (TAO), because it 
funds local projects such as the construction of small-scale water infrastructure. These 
recently empowered administrations, with their council of elected villagers (two 
representatives per village), have the responsibility to promote participatory decentralization 
in rural Thailand (Arghiros, 2001). However, there are still obstacles to achieving this desired 
aim. 
Despite the formal decentralisation, Thailand’s bureaucracy still adheres to a 
hierarchical, top-down institutional culture. In our case study, the TAO president used the 
participatory discourse, but as we will see later, there was a sharp contrast between the 
discourse and her actual practices, as is often the case in participatory projects (Pijnenburg, 
2004). As for the two TAO representatives, they belong to the local economic elite and their 
downward accountability to the community was openly questioned as they were regularly 
accused of taking advantage of their position to serve their own clan’s interests. They felt 
much greater allegiance to upward accountability and defined their role as top-down relays 
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between the sub-district administrators and the villagers. As for the villagers, very few were 
aware of the role they could play in the proposition and realisation of TAO funded projects.  
Village leaders and representatives  
Two leaders played a key role in this ComMod cycle. The first one is a TAO representative. 
He had recently concluded a deal with an external investor, who bought a large piece of land 
in the village to plant high value Oolong tea. As this plantation needed a substantial quantity 
of irrigation water, he was likely to defend his personal interest in the ComMod process. The 
religious leader of the village Christian community (representing 60% of the village 
population) also played a key role. He was not only respected as a religious leader but also as 
a knowledgeable innovator and leader in agricultural matters, actively supporting poor 
households facing difficulties. His charisma created a federative form of power within the 
Christian community and among poor villagers. He was the first to raise the idea of using 
ComMod to discuss water sharing problems.  
Cultural issues that played a role in the learning process  
Several cultural aspects of the context played a key role in the power games and the collective 
dynamic of the ComMod process. First, as mentioned before, there was the cultural issue of a 
western ComMod researcher openly embracing the critical system theory, highligting the 
situation of the poor in the RPG and ABM simulations. This is all the more important since 
this participatory process was conducted in a society in which people evade public 
confrontation and not very used to open participatory deliberations. Akha people do not like 
conflicts (traditionally, when a conflict would occur among people in a settlement, the whole 
community would move and settle somewhere else) and although these values tend to erode 
over time, Akha people remain very much community-oriented (Goodman, 1996). Moreover, 
the conversion to Christian religion of half of the villagers of this community (villagers from 
the upper hamlet) in the last 20 years makes the cultural picture of this participatory process 
even more plural and complex. There was no real contradiction or conflicts of perspectives 
between the animist and Christian parts of the community (the upper and the down hamlets), 
since most of villagers who converted to Christian religion did so more for practical reasons 
than for ideological reasons (“because every one in this hamlet is Christian” and “because 
there are less rituals and donations” were the main reasons given by the villagers from the 
upper hamlet). However, the religious beliefs of the Christian leader influenced his views, 
discourses and actions in favour of the poorest of the community. Lastly, ethnic minorities 
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living in the uplands of Northern Thailand (the Golden Triangle) have long been considered 
by the Thai majority as “backwards” people, if not dangerous. Opium dealers, communists, 
forest destroyers: these clichés about upland ethnic minorities are very common among Thai 
people and in Thai administrations (Ganjanapan, 1997). In our case study, if the president of 
the TAO council was Akha, the TAO officers were all Thai government employees. Their 
perception of the villagers remained influenced by the above-mentioned clichés. This cultural 
dimension reinforced stereotyping, limited communication and power asymmetries between 
villagers and TAO officers.  
Analysis of power dynamics in the learning and negotiation process 
In this section we analyze the influence and mechanisms of power games at key stages of the 
ComMod mediated cross-cultural learning and negotiation process.   
Structure of the game increased awareness of a problem to be solved collectively  
In the first gaming session, the players acted as in reality: the well-off farmers hurried to 
install water pipes, and did not allow others access to water from the upstream sections. This 
highlighted the current conflict caused by the first-come-first-served rule and increased the 
participants’ awareness of the problem, its urgency and the need to solve it collectively. As 
the religious leader said, “the game showed everyone we need to change the water allocation 
rules. No need to say anything.”  
This was a key phase in the negotiation process since it determined whose interests would be 
on the agenda. Before the gaming sessions, well-off (type C) farmers with access to water 
denied the water problem. They repeatedly noted: ‘there is no water problem in the village, 
everything is all right.’ They obviously had a good BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated 
Agreement); a clear interest in maintaining the statu quo rather than exploring the water 
problem. If the ComMod process had started with a more classical meeting in which 
discussions prevail, the water-sharing problem might not have emerged as the elite would 
have been able to dominate discussion and agenda-setting. The game, however, facilitated a 
different form of communication, which allowed less powerful villagers to raise their problem 
and to create a collective awareness of its existence.  
Exchanges of perceptions on the problem 
The ComMod process stimulated participants to share perspectives on the water problem. 
Most of participants said the game allowed them to better understand other villagers’ 
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situations, problems and/or perceptions (table 2). In particular, some well-off (type C) farmers 
with water access realized that the first-come-first-served rule would create more and more 
social tensions under the current expansion of irrigated plantations. Two type A and B farmers 
said they realized that “many of [them] had the same problem” (the lack of access to water). 
At first sight, this may be surprising since villagers in a small community tend to know each 
other, but as one participant said: “in every day life, every one goes to his fields; we do not 
have such opportunities to jointly discuss issues.” Moreover, several participants noted the 
game provided some distance from reality and an open playful atmosphere, which both 
facilitated exchanges about the sensitive and conflicting water issue. This was particularly 
important in the Akha cultural context of conflict avoidance.  
Non-threatening re-framing by integrative negotiation of solutions  
The framing of the problem is a crucial step in a negotiation process as it orients people 
towards certain kinds of solutions (Leeuwis, 2004). In this case, when being asked by the 
facilitator to identify the problem, none of the players mentioned the first-come-first-served 
rule. The TAO representative dominated the discussions emphasizing the lack of water and 
suggesting the construction of a single large reservoir above the village catchment. Other 
participants were sceptical about this proposition since they feared it would only benefit a 
minority of farmers, but they did not say anything at this stage. The Christian leader kept 
silent and only expressed himself when the facilitator explicitly asked for other suggestions. 
As he would explain later, he knew that it was impossible to question directly the first-come-
first-served rule because well-off clans would have not accepted it. Furthermore, a direct 
confrontation over this rule would have generated a zero-sum bargaining process in which the 
villagers would have fought to ‘share the cake’; a distributive mode of negotiation in which 
small farmers had no chance to change the situation. Therefore, he suggested increasing the 
amount of water available to be able to share it with more people. By creating a win-win 
situation, he had a chance of getting the attention and support of powerful stakeholders. He 
suggested building small weirs in several creeks and sharing the water within several water 
user groups. In interviews, he and other participants interestingly explained that “without new 
infrastructures, it is impossible to change existing rules.” All participants (except one whose 
plots were above the creeks) raised their hand to vote in favour of this integrative solution. It 
is important to notice here that the community-oriented Akha way of life deeply influenced 
the trajectory of this creative learning process. The importance of peace and consensus within 
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the community favoured the acceptance of this win-win solution by the well-off farmers 
despite their interest in statu quo.  
Importance of discussions behind the scenes 
The above-mentioned proposal (several small weirs) was tested in the second gaming session. 
It stimulated discussions, further supported by hybrid Agent Based Model (ABM) simulations 
(Barnaud el al, 2008c), regarding how to share water among beneficiaries of the weirs. At the 
first plenary ABM simulations, the TAO representative used his communication skills and 
authority to impose his idea, i.e. to share water in amounts proportional to the farmers’ 
plantation size. But three weeks later, when new sets of simulations were organized within 
smaller and more homogeneous groups, participants had continued discussions among them 
after the workshop on the water sharing rules and they immediately agreed on sharing equal 
amounts of water. They added the possibility to temporarily lend out water rights to other 
farmers in case of excess of water. This shift illustrates the importance of discussions “behind 
the scenes” in-between ComMod workshops. In particular, as explained below, much of the 
process of empowerment of the marginalized which progressively led to the emergence of 
pro-poor solutions occurred “behind the scenes”. Moreover, once more at this stage, the pro-
community dimension of the Akha culture was influential. Indeed, interviews revealed that an 
old and respected farmer belonging to a well-off and influential clan said after the workshop 
to other villagers that he was in favour of an equal way of sharing the water to preserve peace 
in the community.  
Reaching agreement   
In a decision-making process, the phase at which the protagonists reach agreement is a 
determining one. At this stage, in spite of previous phases of improved communication and 
exchange of perspectives, influential participants (consciously or unconsciously) can exert 
power to impose their point of view (Van der Veen 2000). This can lead to a simple 
reproduction of initial power inequities. In our case study, three months after the last 
ComMod workshop, the TAO representative felt inclined to present his initial idea of the 
single reservoir to the TAO council rather than the agreed upon solution of several weirs. 
However, ten months later, the TAO representative and the Christian leader had started to 
collaborate and they had proposed the TAO council a project that took into account the 
interests of small farmers with no access to water.  
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A process which empowered the marginalized  
In spite of initial power inequities, the interests of the marginalized were progressively taken 
into account in the negotiation arena. This was achieved through individual and collective 
empowerment. Along the process, the participants became more and more aware and self-
confident about the water issue and the TAO village projects. In the interviews, the ideas they 
expressed about theses issues were more and more elaborate, and during the group 
discussions, they more and more dared to express their opinion. The development of 
individual self-confidence is particularly important in the cultural context of northern 
Thailand, where prejudices against ethnic minorities persist and strongly affect people’s 
notion of self-efficacy. Several villagers (in particular type A farmers) believed that they had 
neither valuable ideas nor the skills to express them. In this light, it is remarkable that a 
female participant noted: ‘I am so proud. I did not know that I would be able to play the game, 
to think by myself about solutions’. Furthermore, evaluation interviews revealed that the 
feeling of collective empowerment was one of the stronger effects of the ComMod process. 
Most of the participants explained the ComMod process made them realize that collectively 
they were ‘stronger’ or ‘more intelligent’ than individually. “Without the game, everyone 
thinks and act on his own. With the game, we discuss and think together, and we can find 
better solutions”, said a B participant. And one step further: less powerful stakeholders 
realised they could join a charismatic leader to create an alliance and counter power. Most of 
this counter power was built “behind the scenes” in-between and after the ComMod 
workshops.  
Potential and limits of this critical ComMod process to level the playing 
field 
In this ComMod process, as facilitators, we adopted a critical attitude, i.e. we explicitly took 
into account power asymmetries to try to facilitate an equitable concerted process. In this 
section, we identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our cultural-embedded 
methodological choices. Final questions were: were our methods able to deal with power 
inequities and include the marginalized?  What was the legitimacy of these cultural-embedded 
choices?   
Strengths 
First, we argue the need for an initial analysis of power asymmetries among stakeholders in 
the local socio-political context. Among practitioners of participatory approaches there is a 
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debate about the kind of initial analysis needed before starting a participatory process. In our 
experiment, the initial analysis allowed us to identify constraints for an equitable concerted 
process and to mitigate them by adapting the methods and tools we used. A methodological 
proposition for such an initial analysis is available in (Barnaud et al., 2008b). The formulation 
of ComMod activities were then guided by the concern for the less powerful actors. 
 
The careful selection of participants was a determining factor to go towards the 
creation of a level playing field. Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) argue not all stakeholders 
should systematically participate in a multi-stakeholder process. If not yet empowered prior to 
such an exercise, the less powerful ones might not be able to properly defend their interests. 
This is the reason why we started the ComMod process at the village level, only integrating 
stakeholders of higher institutional levels when villagers felt comfortable and explicitly 
requested the presence of these decision-makers. When selecting the participants, we also 
tried to avoid the representation of a category of stakeholders by a single, shy person. For 
example, several women would have felt intimidated and shy when being alone, but in 
company of acquaintances they were more self-confident and talkative. Moreover, ComMod 
provides an opportunity to meet and exchange to a specific set of participants; the selection of 
participants hence influences the alliances that emerge during the process. For example, the 
identification and the active involvement of key stakeholders such as the Christian leader, 
who was particularly bottom-up minded and had sufficient charismatic authority to stimulate 
people to follow him, proved to be crucial.  
To increase the self-confidence and capacity of participants to express their opinions, they 
should genuinely understand the model in use and for so participate in its construction. Some 
ComMod researchers think it is better not to prepare a model and RPG in advance, so as not 
to impose their science-based perspective, but to build the conceptual model from scratch in 
plenary discussions with the stakeholders. However, in this ComMod experiment, we 
considered in plenary discussions village elite would probably impose their perception and set 
the agenda, so it was decided to construct the model from the information gathered via 
individual interviews with farmers of all farm categories. Disadvantage of this approach is 
that participants need time to build self-confidence before they dare to criticise the 
researchers’ model. But advantage is that the researchers can take care to represent all 
stakeholders’ interests, also those of the marginalized, in the RPG and ABM. In this way, we 
could put the issues-at-stake for the marginalized on the agenda. Despite the Akha culture of 
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conflict avoidance, it was accepted the ComMod scientist visualised the confronting situation 
via the RPG and ABM simulations. This enabled the farmers to tackle the issue. 
Wollenberg et al. (2001) underline participatory approaches often fail to tackle power 
inequities because they try to reach a consensus too fast. This experiment demonstrated how 
important it was to move beyond the first apparent consensus when facilitating the plenary 
discussions, as it often reflected the interest of the most powerful participants. This is 
especially important in Akha and Thai cultures that emphasize respect for hierarchy. To move 
beyond the ‘initial public consensus’, we also conducted individual interviews and small 
group discussions alongside plenary discussions. This provided the participants the 
opportunity to freely express and further articulate their opinions. Typically, in a plenary 
session, participants stated they lacked water as they had no money to buy PVC pipes, while 
in individual interviews the same persons quickly incriminated the first-come-first-served 
rule.  
As most conflicts are not solved in public but behind the scenes (Fisher and Ury, 1981), the 
continual and iterative nature of the ComMod process is a feature favouring the re-framing of 
matter, gradual articulation of opinions, empowerment of less vocal and the integration of 
multiple interests. If the ComMod process had stopped after a single gaming workshop, we 
would have missed the opportunity to monitor and support the individual and collective 
empowerment processes needed to attain a fair village discussion and a more equitable 
solution.  
Limits and perspectives for improvement  
All the factors mentioned above allowed some usually voiceless people to participate in the 
elaboration of a new project at the village level. However, the question remains what impact 
this will actually have on the life of this community? What perspectives for improvements did 
this experiment suggest? 
Only 12 villagers participated to the third ComMod cycle on water management. They were 
selected by the research team to be representative of the different types of farming households 
in the village, but they were not considered by the other villagers as their representatives or 
spokespersons. Therefore, no village-level decisions could be formally taken during the 
ComMod workshops. The discussions among the 12 participants more or less diffused across 
other villagers since a TAO village project was finally designed at the village level. However, 
several participants mentioned that ‘those who played the game now think differently, in a 
more cooperative way, but those who did not play the game do not all think the same way.’ 
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This was considered a main limit of this ComMod process. However, it is difficult to organize 
gaming sessions with more than 15-20 participants, and it would be too costly to multiply 
their number. A first solution could be a game that the villagers could play autonomously 
without guidance of researchers. The effect of multiple use of such a game highly depends on 
the commitment and training of a local facilitator. To attain a fair discussion it is important to 
have a skilled facilitator, readily available to regularly play the game and closely monitor 
village discussions, working on empowerment of the marginalised and integration of 
perspectives. Such a ‘champion’ may be difficult to find. The religious leader was initially 
identified as such a potential local facilitator but in spite of his general support of the 
ComMod approach, he finally refused to ensure this heavy task. The TAO representative 
expressed his interest to be such a facilitator, but the research team considered that the risk 
was too high that he manipulates the process to serve his own interests. Another option could 
be to call village meetings after each workshop to present and discuss the results in an 
interactive way to all villagers. A new combination of RPG and ABM was tested for such a 
purpose in a ComMod experiment conducted in another province of northern Thailand 
(Barnaud et al., 2008b).    
Second, this ComMod experiment failed to stimulate a genuine bottom-up dialogue between 
the villagers and their TAO president. If the process reinforced the villagers’ ability to make 
creative and concerted suggestions to the TAO, it did not reinforce the ability of TAO officers 
and managers to genuinely listen to villagers. In spite of her discourse on participation, the 
TAO president arrived late at the ComMod workshop and discouraged rather than listened to 
the villagers. Later on, when the villagers finally submitted their project to the TAO council, 
she refused to fund it. Greater efforts should be pursued to know the front-office and back-
office discourse of these key actors, to raise their awareness and interest in the potential of a 
deliberative ComMod process enabling them to arrive at better informed, sustainable 
decisions. At this stage of the decentralisation process, most Thai organisations and officers 
are not yet ready to participate in a truly bottom-up dialogue. The training of a new generation 
of local administrators in the potential, limits and risks of participatory approaches may 
change their appreciation and promote their critical use.  
Conclusion 
This experiment illustrates the pertinence of taking power games into account in participatory 
processes. The case shows it is not always enough to put stakeholders together around a table 
to achieve a fair and equitable concerted process. This paper calls for a critical companion 
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modelling approach, paying attention to power relations, in which the socio-political system is 
carefully analysed and monitored to identify the main constraints militating against an 
equitable concerted process, and to creatively adapt existing methods and tools to mitigate 
them.  
However, such a posture raises several questions. Here a foreign process designer used 
her cultural space for manoeuvre to put the issue of equity on the agenda. Beside the practical 
question of the costs and feasibility of a preliminary in-depth analysis of power relations, it 
raises the key question of the facilitators’ involvement and commitment. Is it legitimate for 
researchers to be involved in processes that modify power games in the negotiation arena by 
empowering the powerless participants? If not, should they adopt a neutral posture? But this 
experiment shows that facilitators’ neutrality is an illusion: overlooking power relations 
entails the risk of increasing social inequities. Moreover, claiming facilitators’ neutrality is 
insidious as unconscious choices drive the process without being examined. Systematically 
expressing and examining the facilitators’ choices is a demanding but wiser course to adopt. If 
facilitators make explicit their cultural or ideological embedded biases and methodological 
choices, these choices can be rejected or accepted as legitimate by stakeholders. This way, the 
social legitimacy of the process can be progressively built, being in itself an important result 
of the cross-cultural learning process.   
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Figure 1. Conceptual analytical framework 
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Figure 2. The three successive ComMod cycles implemented between 2002 and 2005 in Mae 
Salaep 
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 Table 1. Characteristics of the main types of farming households in Mae Salaep  
Farm type A. Vulnerable landless 
or very smallholders 
B. Self-sufficient & 
medium-sized farms  
C. Relatively large & 
diversified farms 
Size (ha/labour (1)) 0.4 – 0.8 0.8 – 2.4 1.3 – 3.2 
Main crops  Maize (for cash) Upland rice (for family 
consumption), maize, 
small and rainfed 
plantations of Assam 
tea or lychee  
Paddy rice (for family 
consumption), maize, 
extensive irrigated 
plantations of lychee, 
Oolong and/or Assam 
tea 
Off-farm employment To meet basic family 
needs 
To mitigate fluctuations 
of farming incomes 
To raise cash and invest 
on the farm 
Total annual household 
cash income (US 
Dollars/year) (2) 
200 420 1,160 
Investment capacity Nil Weak Significant  
(1) l labour unit is equivalent to 300 working days per year. 
(2) In 2005, the local household survival threshold (to meet the household basic needs) was assessed at 210 US 
dollars/household/year, and the annual income from minimum wages paid to city workers was 750 US 
dollars/year.  
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Figure 3. Initial power relations among the local participants in the ComMod process 
implemented in 2005 at Mae Salaep. 
 
  
TAO 
president 
Christian 
leader
Well-off farmers 
(type C) 
Poor farmers 
(types A & B)
TAO village 
representative 
Use legal authority &  
physical resources to exert 
power through force and 
enticement 
Use legal authority &  
physical resources to exert 
power through enticement  Use charismatic authority & knowledge to exert a 
federative power 
Potential federative counter 
power 
Use traditional authority  
& physical resources to exert 
power through enticement  
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Table 2. Participants’ answers to the question “did the process allow you to learn something 
about other participants?” 
 
Categories of answers 
Number of participants who 
gave this answer  
(types of farmers) 
Realized that when all people discuss together, they can find 
better solutions  
4 
(1 A, 2 B, 1 C) 
Realized that other people had problems similar to his/her 
problems regarding water 
2 
(1 A, 1 B) 
Better understood the situation and perception of other 
participants regarding water   
4 
(2 B, 2 C) 
Better understood the practices of other participants 
regarding water   
2 
(2 B) 
Did not learn much about other participants 1 
(1 A) 
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